Divorce--Cruel or Inhuman Treatment as Ground For by S., C. F., Jr.
Volume 55 Issue 1 Article 9 
December 1952 
Divorce--Cruel or Inhuman Treatment as Ground For 
C. F. S. Jr. 
West Virginia University College of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr 
 Part of the Family Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
C. F. S. Jr., Divorce--Cruel or Inhuman Treatment as Ground For, 55 W. Va. L. Rev. (1952). 
Available at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol55/iss1/9 
This Case Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the WVU College of Law at The Research 
Repository @ WVU. It has been accepted for inclusion in West Virginia Law Review by an authorized editor of The 
Research Repository @ WVU. For more information, please contact ian.harmon@mail.wvu.edu. 
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
reasonable care); State v. Snider, 81 W. Va. 522, 94 S.E. 981 (1918)
(failed to distingiish between two degrees of statutory murder).
The rule was extended in State v. DeBoard, supra. There the
defendant was being menaced by several individuals. One instruc-
tion given indicated that there was but one person (the deceased)
molesting the defendant, and stated the defendant's right of self-
defense against him alone. The instruction was held curable. The
court settled this and the instant case by the same rule as applied
in the earlier cases, without distinguishing them, so that it now
seems well established that the incomplete instruction rule has
been extended to include instructions incomplete as to fact.
The policy behind holding an incomplete instruction curable
is that the jury cannot be misled by such an instruction because it
does not actually misstate anything, but merely has an omission
which is supplemented by another instruction. In extending the
rule to factually incomplete instructions, it would seem that the
distinction should have been recognized and that the policy on
which the rule is based should have been considered.
R. A. K.
DIVORCE-CRUEL OR INHUMAN TREATMENT AS GROUND FOR.-
Proceeding by wife against husband for separate maintenance on
ground of cruel or inhuman treatment under W. VA. CODE c. 48,
art. 2, § 4 (Michie 1949). They were married in 1944. He began
to treat her with coldness and indifference almost immediately. He
refused to converse with her, failed or refused to come to meals and
many times used profane language toward her. He refused to visit
her while she was being treated at a hospital. H's demurrer was
overruled and the trial chancellor granted the decree. H appealed.
Held, that the conduct of the husband did not constitute cruel or
inhuman treatment. Decree reversed; cause dismissed. Davis v.
Davis, 70 S.E.2d 889 (W. Va. 1952).
It should be noted that -the decision in the above case does not
expound new law in West Virginia. The law on this subject seems
to be well settled and has been so since the case of Goff v. Goff, 60
W. Va. 9, 53 S.E. 769 (1907). The purpose of this comment then
is not to bring new law before the bar, but merely to point out and
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discuss the decisions which the West Virginia court has handed
down since 1936. The cases prior to that time have been discussed.
Colson, West Virginia Divorce Law, 43 W. VA. L.Q. 298 (1937).
The Code provides that cruel or inhuman treatment is ground
for an absolute divorce as well as separate maintenance. W. VA.
CODE c. 48, art. 2, §§ 4 and 29 (Michie 1949). The problem arises
when an attempt is made to find what the legislature means by the
phrase "cruel or inhuman treatment."
In a suit for divorce where cruel or inhuman treatment is
relied upon, the result depends upon the circumstances of each
case. Kessel v. Kessel, 131 W. Va. 289, 46 S.E.2d 792 (1948). Since
then a general definition is from a practical standpoint impossible,
a treatment from a more specific angle is thought desirable.
Our court has held that the following acts are not sufficient
to amount to cruel or inhuman treatment: a single blow not in-
volving appreciable injury, Persinger v. Persinger, 133 W. Va. 312,
56 S.E.2d 110 (1949); locking wife out of apartment, pushing her
onto bed and perhaps humiliating her at a social club, Kessel v.
Kessel, 131 W. Va. 239, 46 S.E.2d 792 (1948); wrangling and quar-
reling, Cochran v. Cochran, 130 W. Va. 605, 44 S.E.2d 828 (1947);
an unjustifiable denial of sexual intercourse, Cottle v. Cottle, 129
W. Va. 344, 40 S.E.2d 863 (1946); cursing, nagging and falsely accus-
ing husband of infidelity, McLaughlin v. McLaughlin, 126 W. Va.
498, 29 S.E.2d 1 (1944); and a false accusation of adultery made
by the wife, Wolfe v. Wolfe, 120 W. Va. 389, 198 S.E. 209 (1938).
Other jurisdictions, following along very closely with West
Virginia, have found these acts to be insufficient: nagging, falsely
accusing husband of infidelity and a pretended suicide by wife,
Bosveld v. Bosveld, 232 Iowa 1199, 7 N.W.2d 782 (1943) ; slapping
wife on cheek and throwing a coffee roll at her, Edelman v. Edelman,
165 Pa. Super. 121, 69 A.2d 165 (1949); wife, while intoxicated,
throwing a pan of scalding water onto her husband, Pugliese v.
Pugliese, 136 Pa. Super. 121, 7 A.2d 41 (1939); and slapping and
pinching of wife by husband, Brown v. Brown, 215 S.C. 502, 56
S.E.2d 330 (1949).
Obviously, the courts feel that acts such as these could have
been easily forgiven and forgotten had there been the proper dis-
position on the part of each to overlook the faults and failings of
the other.
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On the other hand, our court has found the following to be
sufficient to constitute cruel and inhuman treatment: several bodily
assaults on wife by husband, Finnegan v. Finnegan, 134 W. Va. 94,
58 S.E.2d 594 (1950); hitting, slapping and kicking wife while
attempting to choke her, Miles v. Miles, 131 W. Va. 513, 48 S.E.2d
669 (1948); false accusation of prostitution made by husband to wife,
Cochran v. Cochran, 130 W. Va. 605, 44 S.E.2d 828 (1947); several
violent blows and brandishing of a knife over wife, Myers v. Myers,
127 W. Va. 551, 33 S.E.2d 897 (1945).
It appears that some of the acts which have been held sufficient
to amount to cruelty are inconsistent with those not amounting to
cruelty. The answer to this apparent conflict can be found by
applying the subjective test of: was this conduct cruel when in-
flicted by the particular defendant upon the particular plaintiff?
From the above holdings it can easily be seen that in this
jurisdiction violence or apprehension thereof is not an indispen-
sable element of statutory cruelty. However, actual violence, to
constitute a ground for divorce, must be attended with danger of
life, limb or health, or be such as to cause reasonable apprehension
of such danger. Smith v. Smith, 125 W. Va. 489, 24 S.E.2d 902
(1943).
It is also well settled that mere incompatibility is not such
a circumstance upon which a decree of divorce may be obtained.
McLaughlin v. McLaughlin, 126 W. Va. 498, 29 S.E.2d 1 (1-944).
It is upon this point of incompatibility that the West Virginia
court, in its very admirable attempt to keep intact existing marital
relationships, has perhaps been somewhat strict. For example,
see Harbert v. Harbert, 130 W. Va. 704, 45 S.E.2d 15 (1947). In
that case, the court, even after concluding that the parties were un-
happily married and that they likely could never get along together,
declined to grant a divorce.
Accepting the fact that many marriages are formed by incom-
patible individuals capable of being happily married to others, and
the fact that a great proportion of these marriages will end in
divorce in any event-what is to be gained by such a strict inter-
pretation of the statutory phrase "cruel or inhuman treatment"?
Since it is well known that a marriage broken early is less
devastating than one broken after a number of years of attempted
3
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adjustment, it seems that perhaps society would profit by a less
stringent interpretation. It is further suggested that the stand
taken by the courts in Peterson v. Peterson, 240 P.2d 1075 (Okla.
1952) and Wilson v. Wilson, 229 Minn. 126, 38 N.W.2d 154 (1949),
and the dissenting opinion in Cottle v. Cottle, 129 W. Va. 344, 40
S.E.2d 863 (1946), would be well worth a thought. In these
opinions it is stated that where the conduct of either spouse is such
as utterly to destroy the legitimate ends of matrimony it is sufficient
to constitute cruelty.
A very apt summation of what appears to be the present ten-
dency toward a more liberal policy is found in Pavletich v. Pav-
letich, 50 N.M. 224, 174 P.2d 826 (1946). There the court said that
denial of divorce seldom restores life to families sociologically dead
when they come into court, and that if anything is preserved it is
but the dead and empty shell of what has been and is no longer.
C. F. S., Jr.
MINES AND MINERALs-OwNERSHIP OF CONTAINING SPAcE.-fV,
owner in fee of a tract of land, conveyed it, excepting and reserving
the ". . . oil, gas and brine and all minerals, except coal . . . the
term 'mineral' as used herein does not include clay, sand, stone or
surface minerals ...... to T, who reconveyed to P, subject to the
exception stated. Thereafter, W leased said tract to D, ". . . for
the purpose of searching for, exploring, drilling and operating for
and marketing oil and gas ... ." W and D later entered into a gas
storage agreement, whereby D was given the right to use and occupy
the Big Lime stratum underlying said tract, for the purpose of
-. injecting and storing gas therein and removing gas therefrom.
." Pursuant to this agreement, D drilled a well to the Big Lime
stratum but no oil or gas was produced therefrom, and later D
piped gas from elsewhere for storage in said stratum. P sought to
enjoin D from using the Big Lime stratum for storage of gas,
alleging in his bill that there were no recoverable minerals in the
Big Lime stratum, and hence D was guilty of a continuing trespass.
D demurred. The circuit court sustained the demurrer, overruling
the court of common pleas and certified the question to'the supreme
court of appeals. Held, that W's deed operated to pass title through
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